SPAY AND NEUTER LAW
NC LAW NOW IN FORCE - This is the spay/neuter act JFA worked to get passed in 2001. The law now officially recognizes that pet overpopulation is a serious humane and financial problem in this state. This is very important because that recognition carries governmental responsibility with it.
The General Assembly finds that the uncontrolled breeding of cats and dogs in the State has led to unacceptable numbers of unwanted dogs, puppies and cats and kittens. These unwanted animals become strays and constitute a public nuisance and a public health hazard. The animals themselves suffer privation and death, are impounded, and most are destroyed at great expense to local governments. It is the intention of the General Assembly to provide a voluntary means of funding a spay/neuter program to provide financial assistance to local governments offering low income persons reduced cost spay/ neuter services for their dogs and cats and to provide a statewide education program on the benefits of spaying and neutering pets.
There is established in the Department of Health and Human Services a statewide program to foster the spaying and neutering of dogs and cats for the purpose of reducing the population of unwanted animals in the State. The program shall consist of the following components:
(1) Education Program. The Department shall establish a statewide program to educate the public about the benefits of having cats and dogs spayed and neutered. The Department may work cooperatively on the program with the North Carolina School of Veterinary Medicine, other State agencies and departments, county and city health departments and animal control agencies, and statewide and local humane organizations. The Department may employ outside consultants to assist with the education program.
(2) Local Spay/Neuter Assistance Program. The Department shall administer the Spay/Neuter Account established in G.S. 19A 52. Monies deposited in the account shall be available to reimburse eligible counties and cities for the direct costs of spay/neuter surgeries for cats and dogs made available to low income persons.
(a) Creation. The Spay/Neuter Account is established as a nonreverting special revenue account in the Department of Health and Human Services. The Account consists of the following:
(1) Fifty cents (50¢) of the fee imposed by G.S. 130A 190(c) on the costs of obtaining rabies vaccination tags from the Department of Health and Human Services.
(2) Ten dollars ($10.00) of the additional fee imposed by G.S. 20 79.7 for an Animal Lovers special license plate.
(3) Any other funds available from appropriations by the General Assembly or from contributions and grants from public or private sources.
(b) Use. The revenue in the Account shall be used by the Department of Health and Human Services as follows:
(1) Twenty percent (20%) shall be used to develop and implement the statewide education program component of the Spay/Neuter Program established in G.S. 19A 51(a).
(2) Up to twenty percent (20%) of the money in the Account may be used to defray the costs of administering the Spay/Neuter Program established in this Article.
(3) Funds remaining after deductions for the education program and administrative expenses shall be distributed quarterly to eligible counties and cities seeking reimbursement for reduced cost spay/neuter surgeries performed during the previous year.
(a) A county or city is eligible for reimbursement from the Spay/Neuter Account if it meets the following condition:
(1) The county or city offers one or more of the following programs to low income persons on a year round basis for the purpose of reducing the cost of spaying and neutering procedures for dogs and cats:
a. A spay/neuter clinic operated by the county or city.
b. A spay/neuter clinic operated by a private organization under contract or other arrangement with the county or city.
c. A contract or contracts with one or more veterinarians, whether or not located within the county, to provide reduced cost spaying and neutering procedures.
d. Subvention of the spaying and neutering costs incurred by low income pet owners through the use of vouchers or other procedure that provides a discount of the cost of the spaying or neutering procedure fixed by a participating veterinarian or other provider.
e. Subvention of the spaying and neutering costs incurred by persons who adopt a pet from an animal shelter operated by or under contract with the county or city.
(b) For purposes of this Article, the term "low income person" shall mean an individual who qualifies for one or more of the programs of public assistance administered by the Department pursuant to Chapter 108A of the General Statutes.
(a) Reimbursable Costs. Counties and cities eligible for distributions from the Spay/Neuter Account may receive reimbursement for the direct costs of a spay/neuter surgical procedure for a dog or cat owned by a low income person meeting the Department's eligibility requirements for spay/neuter services. Reimbursable costs shall include anesthesia, medication, and veterinary services. Counties and cities shall not be reimbursed for the administrative costs of providing reduced cost spay/neuter services or capital expenditures for facilities and equipment associated with the provision of such services.
(b) Application. A county or city eligible for reimbursement of spaying and neutering costs from the Spay/Neuter Account shall apply to the Department of Health and Human Services by the last day of January, April, July, and October of each year to receive a distribution from the Account for that quarter. The application shall be submitted in the form required by the Department and shall include an itemized listing of the costs for which reimbursement is sought.
(c) Distribution. The Department shall make payments from the Spay/Neuter Account to eligible counties and cities who have made timely application for reimbursement within 30 days of the closing date for receipt of applications for that quarter. In the event that total requests for reimbursement exceed the amounts available in the Spay/Neuter Account for distribution, the monies available will be distributed as follows:
(1) Fifty percent (50%) of the monies available in the Spay/Neuter Account shall be reserved for reimbursement for eligible applicants within enterprise tier one, two, and three areas as defined in G.S. 105 129.3. The remaining fifty percent (50%) of the funds shall be used to fund reimbursement requests from eligible applicants in enterprise tier four and five areas as defined in G.S. 105 129.3.
(2) Among the eligible counties and cities in enterprise tier one, two, and three areas, reimbursement shall be made to each eligible county or city in proportion to the number of dogs and cats that have received rabies vaccinations during the preceding fiscal year in that county or city as compared to the number of dogs and cats that have received rabies vaccinations during the preceding fiscal year by all of the eligible applicants in enterprise tier one, two, or three areas.
(3) Among the eligible counties and cities in enterprise tier four and five areas, reimbursement shall be made to each eligible county or city in proportion to the number of dogs and cats that have received rabies vaccinations during the preceding fiscal year in that county or city as compared to the number of dogs and cats that have received rabies vaccinations during the preceding fiscal year by all of the eligible applicants in enterprise tier four and five areas.
(4) Should funds remain available from the fifty percent (50%) of the Spay/Neuter Account designated for enterprise tier one, two, or three areas after reimbursement of all claims by eligible applicants in those areas, the remaining funds shall be made available to reimburse eligible applicants in enterprise tier four and five areas.
Every county or city animal shelter, or animal shelter operated under contract with a county or city or otherwise in receipt of State or local funding [,] shall prepare an annual report setting forth the numbers, by species, of animals received into the shelter, the number adopted out, the number returned to owner, and the number destroyed. The report shall also contain the total operating expenses of the shelter and the cost per animal handled. The report shall be filed with the Department of Health and Human Services by August 1 of each year.
ANIMAL CRUELTY LAWS
(a) If any person shall intentionally overdrive, overload, wound, injure, torment, kill, or deprive of necessary sustenance, or cause or procure to be overdriven, overloaded, wounded, injured, tormented, killed, or deprived of necessary sustenance, any animal, every such offender shall for every such offense be guilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor.
(b) If any person shall maliciously torture, mutilate, maim, cruelly beat, disfigure, poison, or kill, or cause or procure to be tortured, mutilated, maimed, cruelly beaten, disfigured, poisoned, or killed, any animal, every such offender shall for every such offense be guilty of a Class I felony. However, nothing in this section shall be construed to increase the penalty for cockfighting provided for in G.S. 14‑362.
(c) As used in this section, the words "torture", "torment", and "cruelly" include or refer to any act, omission, or neglect causing or permitting unjustifiable pain, suffering, or death. As used in this section, the word "intentionally" refers to an act committed knowingly and without justifiable excuse, while the word "maliciously" means an act committed intentionally and with malice or bad motive. As used in this section, the term "animal" includes every living vertebrate in the classes Amphibia, Reptilia, Aves, and Mammalia except human beings. However, this section shall not apply to the following activities:
(1) The lawful taking of animals under the jurisdiction and regulation of the Wildlife Resources Commission, except that this section shall apply to those birds exempted by the Wildlife Resources Commission from its definition of "wild birds" pursuant to G.S. 113‑129(15a).
(2) Lawful activities conducted for purposes of biomedical research or training or for purposes of production of livestock, poultry, or aquatic species.
(2a) Lawful activities conducted for the primary purpose of providing food for human or animal consumption.
(3) Activities conducted for lawful veterinary purposes.
(4) The lawful destruction of any animal for the purposes of protecting the public, other animals, property, or the public health.
"(c) As used in this section, the words 'torture', 'torment', and 'cruelly' include or refer to any act, omission, or neglect causing or permitting unjustifiable pain, suffering, or death. As used in this section, the word 'intentionally' refers to an act committed knowingly and without justifiable excuse, while the word 'maliciously" means an act committed intentionally and with malice or bad motive. As used in this section, the term 'animal' includes every living vertebrate except human beings. However, this section shall not apply to the following activities:
"(1) The lawful taking of animals under the jurisdiction and regulation of the Wildlife Resources Commission, except that this section shall apply to those birds exempted by the Wildlife Resources Commission from its definition of 'wild birds' pursuant to G.S. 113‑129(15a);
"(2) Lawful activities conducted for purposes of biomedical research or training or for purposes of production of livestock or poultry;
"(3) Activities conducted for lawful veterinary purposes; or
"(4) The lawful destruction of any animal for the purposes of protecting the public, other animals, property, or the public health."
1. In general
A dog is the subject of property, both in the absence of statute and under Revisal 1905, ' 3299, making it a misdemeanor to willfully injure or cruelly kill any useful animal, and defining the word "animal" as including every living creature, and the word "cruelly" to include every act causing unjustifiable physical pain or death, so that accused was guilty of the offense of willfully killing a dog, where the dog, when killed, was in the street outside of his turkey yard, which was inclosed by an impassable fence and gate, and could have been driven away; the fact that the dog had been in the yard before harassing the turkeys, and his bad habits, being immaterial. State v. Smith, 1911, 72 S.E. 321, 156 N.C. 628. Animals k 87
Revisal 1905, ' 3299, relating to cruelty to animals, enumerates as subjects protected from cruelty any useful beast, fowl, or animal, and provides that the words "torture," "torment," or "cruelty" shall include every act, omission, or neglect whereby unjustifiable physical pain, suffering, or death is permitted. Held, that poisoning chickens is within the purview of the statute. State v. Bossee, 1907, 59 S.E. 879, 145 N.C. 579. Animals k 40
It is no defense to an indictment for cruelty to animals that the killing was done on an "impulse of anger." State v. Neal, 1897, 27 S.E. 81, 120 N.C. 613, 58 Am.St.Rep. 810. Animals k 40
The needless killing of chickens is cruelty, within Code, ' 2482, though done without torture. State v. Neal, 1897, 27 S.E. 81, 120 N.C. 613, 58 Am.St.Rep. 810. Animals k 40
A conviction for cruelty to animals is sustained by proof of impaling a chicken on a stick, and beating a hen to death. State v. Neal, 1897, 27 S.E. 81, 120 N.C. 613, 58 Am.St.Rep. 810. Animals k 40
On a trial for cruelty in killing chickens, a charge that defendant must be justified in the killing was erroneous. State v. Neal, 1897, 27 S.E. 81, 120 N.C. 613, 58 Am.St.Rep. 810. Animals k 40
In Code, ' 1003, making it a misdemeanor to willfully and unlawfully kill or abuse any "horse, mule, hog, sheep or other cattle," the word "cattle" is used in its general sense, and embraces all domestic quadrupeds, including goats. State v. Groves, 1896, 25 S.E. 819, 119 N.C. 822. Animals k 40
One who injures a hog running at large in violation of a valid town ordinance cannot be indicted under Code, ' 1002, making it a misdemeanor for any person to "kill, maim, or injure any live stock lawfully running at large." State v. Tweedy, 1894, 20 S.E. 183, 115 N.C. 704. Animals k 57
One who inflicts suffering and death on any useful beast, fowl, or animal, for amusement and sport, is within Code, ' 2482, which makes the injuring, torturing, and tormenting and the needless killing of such animals a misdemeanor, and which defines the words "torture," "torment," and "cruelty" as including every act, omission, and neglect whereby unjustifiable physical pain, suffering, or death is caused or permitted. State v. Porter, 1893, 16 S.E. 915, 112 N.C. 887. Animals k 40
Under Code, ' 2482, making it an offense to "wound" an animal, one may be indicted for "shooting" an animal. State v. Butts, 1885, 92 N.C. 784. Animals k 45
1.5. Jurisdiction
Trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to entertain gun club owner's declaratory judgment action, seeking declaratory judgment regarding constitutionality of criminal statute, prohibiting intentional wounding or killing of animals, on its face and as applied to owner, who planned to host pigeon shoot; issues raised in owner's declaratory judgment action necessarily involved questions of fact, as well as questions of law, any prosecution would be for future conduct, the nature of which was unknown, and owner did not establish that prosecution would result in irreparable injury to his property interests or fundamental human rights. Malloy v. Easley, 2001, 551 S.E.2d 911, 146 N.C.App. 66, certiorari allowed 556 S.E.2d 571, 354 N.C. 364. Declaratory Judgment k 124.1
2. Willful act, generally
Jury was not required to believe that defendant administered disciplinary measures against dog in effort to train animal, and defendant was accordingly not entitled to nonsuit because of testimony by his witnesses to that effect. State v. Fowler, 1974, 205 S.E.2d 749, 22 N.C.App. 144. Animals k 42
To be punished under animal abuse statute, act must be willful; "willful" means more than intentional, and means without just cause, excuse, or justification. State v. Fowler, 1974, 205 S.E.2d 749, 22 N.C.App. 144. Animals k 40
In prosecution for willfully and needlessly killing a dog, accused would not have been justified in killing the dog for previous offense of trespassing if such had been shown. State v. Dickens, 1939, 1 S.E.2d 837, 215 N.C. 303. Animals k 102
The willful killing of a dog is embraced within prohibition of statute making it unlawful to willfully injure, needlessly mutilate or kill any "useful beast" or "animal." C.S. ' 4483. State v. Dickens, 1939, 1 S.E.2d 837, 215 N.C. 303. Animals k 45
One of the essential elements of the offense of willfully and needlessly killing a dog is that killing be willfully done, the word "willful" meaning something more than an intention to do a thing, and implying the doing of the act purposely and deliberately, indicating a purpose to do it without authority, careless whether he has the right or not, in violation of law, or as being without just cause, excuse or justification. State v. Dickens, 1939, 1 S.E.2d 837, 215 N.C. 303. Animals k 45
An indictment charging that defendant did "knowingly, willfully, and needlessly act in a cruel manner towards a certain fowl, to wit, a chicken, by killing the said chicken," is a sufficient charge of cruelty, under Code, ' 1183. State v. Neal, 1897, 27 S.E. 81, 120 N.C. 613, 58 Am.St.Rep. 810. Animals k 42
On a prosecution, under Code, ' 2482, for cruelty to animals, where it appeared that defendant, a policeman, struck and felled a runaway horse with a large stone, it was error to direct a verdict of guilty, it being for the jury to determine whether the presumption that defendant acted in good faith was overcome by proof of a willful purpose to injure the animal. State v. Isley, 1896, 26 S.E. 35, 119 N.C. 862. Animals k 42
Under Code, ' 2482, declaring it a misdemeanor to "willfully overdrive, overload, wound, injure, torture, torment, deprive of necessary sustenance, or cruelly beat, or needlessly mutilate, or kill, * * * any useful beast, fowl, or animal," an indictment charging that defendant did willfully, etc., "torture, torment, and act in a cruel manner towards" a hog, does not sufficiently charge the statutory offense; the words employed in the indictment not having any technical or certain meaning, but being rather conclusions from a number of facts. State v. Watkins, 1888, 8 S.E. 346, 101 N.C. 702. Animals k 42
In an indictment under Acts 1881, c. 368, for cruelty to an animal, the offense is properly charged as "unlawfully and willfully" done. State v. Allison, 1884, 90 N.C. 733. Animals k 42
3. Training
In prosecution for unlawfully, willfully, maliciously, cruelly and needlessly beating and torturing a useful animal, it was error to refuse to allow defendant to testify as to Koehler methods of training animals and to refuse to allow other witnesses of defendant to give similar testimony, where they were qualified to testify as experts in field of dog training. State v. Fowler, 1974, 205 S.E.2d 749, 22 N.C.App. 144. Animals k 42
Punishment administered to animal in honest and good‑faith effort to train it is not without justification and not "willful." G.S. ' 14‑360. State v. Fowler, 1974, 205 S.E.2d 749, 22 N.C.App. 144. Animals k 40
4. Defense of property
In prosecution for willfully and needlessly killing a dog, evidence that a dog not shown to be dog of prosecuting witness had previously burst into the front door of the defendant's funeral home was properly excluded where it was not shown that it was necessary to kill in order to protect property. State v. Dickens, 1939, 1 S.E.2d 837, 215 N.C. 303. Animals k 102
Dog may be killed in defense of property attacked by it. State v. Smith, 1911, 72 S.E. 321, 156 N.C. 628. Animals k 45
A dog may be killed in the actual and necessary defense of property attacked by it though the owner did not know of its vicious propensities, and there may have been another mode of defending the property attacked. State v. Smith, 1911, 72 S.E. 321, 156 N.C. 628. Animals k 87
It is no defense to an indictment for cruelty to animals, under Code, ' 2490, that the chickens killed were destroying peas in the garden of defendant's father. State v. Neal, 1897, 27 S.E. 81, 120 N.C. 613, 58 Am.St.Rep. 810. Animals k 40
5. Self defense
In prosecution for unlawfully, willfully, and wantonly killing dog, defendant was not entitled to instruction on self‑defense where only evidence with respect to nature of dog was that he was gentle and had never bitten anyone, where there was no evidence that defendant thought dog was vicious, that dog was attacking defendant or even threatening to attack, or doing anything which would make reasonable person think he was about to attack, and where defendant did not testify that he thought dog was going to attack. State v. Simmons, 1978, 244 S.E.2d 168, 36 N.C.App. 354. Animals k 45
6. Trespassing animals
Presence of a dog upon the premises of funeral home gave employee of funeral home right to drive dog away but not to injure him unnecessarily, although trespassing. State v. Dickens, 1939, 1 S.E.2d 837, 215 N.C. 303. Animals k 96, 102
It is no defense to an indictment, under Code, ' 2482, for wounding a cow, that defendant shot her for entering his field at a point where her owner should have kept the fence in repair. State v. Butts, 1885, 92 N.C. 784. Animals k 102
7. Injury to bystanders
Fact that defendant was unlawfully shooting at a dog in violation of the cruelty to animals statute did not render the act negligent per se in regard to injury to a bystander nor impose on defendant absolute liability for injury to a bystander. Belk v. Boyce, 1964, 138 S.E.2d 789, 263 N.C. 24. Weapons k 18(1)
In view of fact the cruelty to animals statute is not for protection of human beings, its violation through shooting a firearm at a dog did not impose liability on the shooter for injuries sustained to a nearby person in absence of a showing that the shooter knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known, of injured person's presence in the vicinity. Belk v. Boyce, 1964, 138 S.E.2d 789, 263 N.C. 24. Weapons k 18(1)
8. Ordinances
A town may enact an ordinance to prevent hogs from running at large within the town limits, and prescribe a penalty for its violation. State v. Tweedy, 1894, 20 S.E. 183, 115 N.C. 704. Municipal Corporations k 604
9. Weight and sufficiency of evidence
Evidence was sufficient to support finding that defendant acted willfully so as to sustain conviction for cruelty to animal; local animal control department field team supervisor testified that defendant's horse was 300 to 500 pounds underweight and that it would have taken more than six months for horse to become so emaciated and pasture owner testified that he asked defendant to remove horse from owner's pasture several times because there was no food in pasture, that each time defendant said that he would do it right away, and that defendant, however, ignored owner's requests. State v. Talley, 1993, 429 S.E.2d 604, 110 N.C.App. 180, stay denied 432 S.E.2d 356, 334 N.C. 167, dismissal allowed, review denied 433 S.E.2d 171, 334 N.C. 438. Animals k 42
In action to restrain American Legion Post and its commander from carrying on rabbit hunts, plaintiff's evidence was insufficient to survive defendant's motion for judgment as of nonsuit. G.S. ' 14‑360. State ex rel. Bruton ex rel. Yandell v. American Legion Post No. 113, 1962, 124 S.E.2d 885, 256 N.C. 691. Injunction k 130
In prosecution for cruelly beating, tormenting, wounding, injuring, depriving of necessary sustenance, and needlessly killing defendant's livestock, evidence tending merely to prove that certain mules on certain farms were in poor condition and that some of them died, without even proving mules were defendant's, was insufficient for jury. State v. Stiers, 1938, 198 S.E. 601, 214 N.C. 126. Animals k 42
10. Burden of proof
In prosecution for willfully and needlessly killing a dog, burden was not upon the state to establish particular intent as necessary ingredient of criminal offense charged. State v. Dickens, 1939, 1 S.E.2d 837, 215 N.C. 303. Animals k 45
11. Custodial interrogation
Defendant's postarrest statements to veterinarian and local animal control department field team supervisor that he had heard that if you kick horse in hip it will stand up, that his horse needed to be euthanized, and that his horses had not been seen by veterinarian were not result of impermissible custodial interrogation in violation of defendant's Miranda rights in prosecution for cruelty to animal. State v. Talley, 1993, 429 S.E.2d 604, 110 N.C.App. 180, stay denied 432 S.E.2d 356, 334 N.C. 167, dismissal allowed, review denied 433 S.E.2d 171, 334 N.C. 438. Criminal Law k 412.1(2)
12. Judgment and sentence
Trial court did not impermissibly sentence defendant to maximum punishment allowable for cruelty to animal because defendant gave notice of his intent to appeal and exercised right to trial by jury; trial judge offered defendant alternative sentences which included less active time but also included conditions attached to probationary period and defendant failed to accept probationary sentence with its conditions. State v. Talley, 1993, 429 S.E.2d 604, 110 N.C.App. 180, stay denied 432 S.E.2d 356, 334 N.C. 167, dismissal allowed, review denied 433 S.E.2d 171, 334 N.C. 438. Criminal Law k 986.2(6)
13. Review
In prosecution for willfully and needlessly killing a dog, charge, "if you believe all the evidence in this case" and beyond a reasonable doubt, burden of proof being upon the state to so satisfy you, it will be your duty to return a verdict of guilty, while open to criticism, was not prejudicial error where evidence was ample to sustain conviction. State v. Dickens, 1939
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